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This research examines the success of stabilization policies to control hyperinflation in
Bolivia. Money demand functions for the hyperinflation and stabilization periods were
econometrically estimated and statistically tested. We conclude that the demand for money in
Bolivia changed after stabilization policies were implemented, indicating that the new government’s
objectives were met. Stabilization policies resulted in real economic growth for Bolivia’s economy,
including its agricultural sector, where agricultural export shares increased tenfold as stabilization
policies corrected overvalued exchange rates.
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Introduction
Hyperinflation, where monthly inflation
rates exceed 50 percent (Cagan, 1956), became a
major economic problem in the 1980’s in many less
developed countries (LDCS) and continues to plague
LDCS today (New ~frica, April, 1994). Agriculture,
a key sector for LDCS, often accounts for 40-50
percent of gross domestic product and employs a
significant portion of the work force (Hadwiger,
1992). However, LDCS have historically taxed the
agricultural sector while developed countries (DCS)
have protected it (Webb, Lopez, and Penn, 1990;
Valdes, 1993; McCalla and Josling, 1985;
Hadwiger, 1992; and Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes,
1991).’
Along with taxation policies, developing
countries have historically instituted distortionary
macroeconomic policies, often with good intentions,
such as raising revenues to pay off international
debt, but with unintentional destabilizing
consequences (World Bank). Such distortionary
macroeconomic policies favored the industrial sector
at the expense of the agricultural sector via direct
and indirect protection, These destabilizing policies
resulted in (1) hyperinflation; (2) overvalued
exchange rates, which suppressed agricultural
exports making them relatively more expensive to
potential importers; (3) distorted prices, providing
subsidies to the urban sector while taxing the rural,
agricultural sector; and (4) reduced investment
in agriculture. Since agricultural products are a
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significant portion of exports for developing
countries, overvaluation discriminates against the
agricultural sector (Schuh, 1974; McCalla, 1982;
Chambers and Just, 1982).
This article estimates and compares the
money demand functions during the hyperinflation
and the stabilization periods in Bolivia. It also
analyzes the importance of factors underlying the
changes in the demand for money in the two
periods. Finally, the implications of stabilization
policies on agriculture, with particular focus on
agricultural exports, are discussed.2
The Case of Bolivia
During the 1980s, Bolivia suffered two
major economic events: (1) hyperinflation, where
the average annual inflation rate peaked at 8,169
percent in 1985 (Pastor, 1991) and (2) government
stabilization policies, instituted to restore confidence
in Bolivia’s currency and stimulate economic
growth by controlling hyperinflation. Table 1
illustrates average annual inflation rates in selected
developing countries as well as corresponding
macroeconomic policies used to control inflation.
Specifically, Bolivia faced an economic crisis
culminating in hyperinflation from the later part of
1984 through mid-1985 (Melvin, 1988; Pastor,
1991)3. A large fiscaI deficit, negative growth
rates, high unemployment rates, as well as exchange
rate and balance of payment problems characterized
this crisis. These problems were generated in the
mid- 1970s when the prevailing administration over
bonrowed from foreign countries, increased Bolivia’s
fiscal deficit, and discouraged domestic investment
coupled with a high degree of government
intervention as exemplified by ( 1) fixed prices for
many products, (2) fixed exchange rates, (3) fixed
interest rates, and (4) fixed wage increases in the
private sector. Also, regulations prohibited laying
off workers and restrictions precluded holding
foreign currency and conducting financial
transactions in foreign currency. These problems
exacerbated in 1984, when export prices decreased
significantly, droughts and floods were common,
and the economy faced a negative growth rate
troughing at -6.5 percent (Pastor, 1991). The
domestic currency suffered continuous devaluations
at a rate of 50 percent per month in 1985. Also, a
great shortage of basic goods existed, Bolivians lost
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confidence in their domestic currency leading to an
increased demand for U.S. dollars, resulting in a
dramatic increase in the exchange rate (Melvin,
1988). After August 1985, Bolivia’s economy









Interest rates: Regulations were
completely removed.
Exchange rales: Regulations were
completely removed and a floating
cxchangc rate system was implemented.
Prices: All regulations on private sector
prices were removed. For goods and
services produced by public enterprises,
prices were no longer regulated.
Wages and employment: Only a minimum
wage was administered and employers
were allowed to lay off workers.
Fiscal deficit: The objective of reducing
the government deficit was attained by
laying off government workers and
reducing public expenditures.
Foreign Currency: Individuals were free
to make financial transactions in foreign
currency and could now hold foreign
currency.
Subsidies: All subsidies were removed.
As a result of these new policies, the
Bolivian economy changed dramatically during and
after the hyperinflation period. Figure I shows
monthly inflation rates both before and after
stabilization policies were implemented. Although
these new rules restored the economic equilibrium
in a few months, the subsequent recession lasted for
more than two years (Pastor, 199 1).
Bolivians now faced with a different
economic framework should adjust their nominal
money holdings such that their real purchasing
power remains unchanged (Barron, et al., 1989).
However, rapid changes in the inflation rate
introduce uncertainty, such that the quality of a
given stock of real money balances is reduced,186 De la Barra, Marchatr[ and I.vlmka S[ahi/iza/ion Polioe.v and Agricultural [mpacts m Developing Countries
Table 1. AnmmJ Inflation Rates in Selected Countries and Macroeconomic PoJicies Employed to Corrext Inflation
COUNTRY -- INFLATfON -- -- MACROECONOMIC POLICIES --
1981-85 1985-%3
J3RAZfL 160% 954% Cruz.ado plan - Monetary reform, brief wage and price
freeze followed by administered prices, increase in interest
rates, fisctd rebates introduced to stimulate expmm and












FiscaJ and monetary policy, stntcttmd reforms aimed at
Iiberaliiation, joined GA’JT in 1979, wage md price
freew followed by wage and price controls, reduced size
of public sector, deregulation of prices, remowd of price
subsidies, secured more foreign credits
Tight monetary policy, increased tax revenues, reduced
employment in public corporations, dcvdued currency by
93Y0,eliminated debt servicing, mwoduced value added tax
(VAT), obtained extemd fiimwing for investments,
obtained structural adjustment loan from fMF, timed at
annual average price increase of less than 10’%
AustmrJ plan - W]ce fieez.e followed by administered
prices, increased interest rams, economic integration and
cooperative agreement with Brazil in 1986, speciaJ export
programs, obtained loan horn IMP to pay extemd debt
snd reformed pubJic sectnr by mstructming, staffing rmd
adjusting price levels
Expnrt promotion, efficient inprt substitution, greater
domestic savings, imWOvd international payme”k
position, reduced size of public sector and transferred
enterprises tn private sector, increased ceiling for foreign
investment, mduccd import tariffs
Devaluation of official exchange rate (settlement of 50%
of exports and cash grants at the official rate with the
other 50% settled at the exchange agency rate), bank
reserve requirements increased to channel resourms tn key
productive activities, interest rates on Iendmg and
borrowing increased, taxes increased and wages adjusted
Reductvd production costs, reduced interest rates and tax
burden of businesses and individuals, revived domestic
output and demand with expansive monetary and fiscal
policies, maintained overvalued exchange rate in order to
make imported inputs less expensive, and exchange
controls reinforced to ensure availability of foreign
exchange for economic recove~
URUGUAY 50 84 Reduced public sector deficit with measurer designed to
control IJrerise in spending, periodic adJtIStm~tS of rates
and prices for public sctwices, limited tie money supply
growth, wage adjustments with workers and employers
every four months, monitored movements of international
resctves and changes in exchange rate, negotiated new
terms for servicing external public debt
Sources: Data on inflation - CEPAL, Trar@ormacion Produdiva con Equidad and CEPAL, Preliminary Overview ., 1990,
1991, Data for 1%1-1980am from IDB, Economic and Sociaf Progress in l.utin America 1990 Report I“fmrnmim m macro
economic Pdic]es - IDB, Macroeconomic Policies - Economic and SociaJ Progress in I.din America, 1987 Report.
where the quality of money is defined as the,flow of
monetary services (Klein, 1977), If the quality of
money rises, the same monetary services can be
obtained using less real money balances; the reverse
would be true if the quality of money declined,
Thus, we can identify two opposing effects of
hyperinflation on the real demand for local
currency: (I) Hyperinflation reduces the quality of
money, which leads to an increased demand for real
local currency, i.e., the income gflect. (2) As is true
for hyperinflation, inflation induces substitution
from local currency to other financial assets with
higher real rates of return, such that the substitution
ejjlect reduces the demand for local currency.
Consequently, the final impact of hyperinflation is
uncertain (Klein, 1977; Asilis, et al., 1993).J. ,4gr. and Applied Econ., July, 1995










Source UDAPE.Dossier of Statistical Information. UDAPE,LaPaz-Bolivia,1992.
Conceptual Framework
The basis of our conceptual model
stemmed from the “classic” money demand
function, which specifies a direct relationship exists
between real money demand and real income, and
an inverse relationship between real money demand
and interest rates. Incorporating results from the
following researchers, the classic model was
augmented to include additional explanatory
variables, such as lagged moneavdemand, to account
for dynamic adjustment (Cuthbertson and Taylor,
1990); inflation, to capture the effect of price
increases (Cesarano, 199 I; Branson, 1989); the
wage rate, as a proxy for the value of time (Dawd,
1990; Becker, 1976); and exchange rates, as a
hedge against inflation. Based on economic theory
and building upon research results presented above,
six regressors were chosen to estimate the real,
short-run money demand function for Bolivia as













the real interest rate
exchange rate expressed in units of
Bolivian currency per U.S. dollar
real national income
real national wage rates
parameters for i = O, .... 6
disturbance term
The subscript (-1) is a one period lag
As described in the “classic” money
demand function in equation (1), we expect a
positive relationship between real income and real
money demand and a negative relationship between
real interes( rates and real money demand.
However, it is important to point out that the use of188 De la Barra, Marchant and I,slnika: Slahilization Policies and Agricultural Impacts in Developing Countries
banks in Bolivia is not widespread. As such, the
demand for money may not be as responsive to
interest rate changes (Kelfala, 1992). The lagged
money demand, (A/’.], / f{. ]J, is included as an
explanatory variable to capture dynamic
adjustments. A positive relationship is expected,
As stated earlier, the effect of injlation on the real
demand for money is uncertain due to the opposing
substitution and income effects. The average wage
rate is hypothesized to be positively correlated with
the demand for money. According to economic
theory, an increase in wages leads to an increase in
money demand for both transaction and speculative
purposes (Barron, et al., 1989).
The exchange rate appears to be an
important determinant of money demand, In
Bolivia, the exchange rate constituted and still
constitutes the most reliable means of hedging
against inflation. Through a market determined
exchange rate, Bolivians maintain or may improve
their purchasing power by holding wealth in foreign
currency. Consequently, the exchange rate captures
the speculative demand for money with the U.S.
dollar being the most important alternative financial
asset. On this basis, the exchange rate should be
negatively related to the demand for local currency.
EmpiricaI Procedures
Estimation used monthly data from
September 1983 through March 1988. Real values
were obtained by dividing the nominal values by the
consumer price index. s Real interest rates were
obtained by subtracting inflation rates from nominal
interest rates. The annual interest rate on bank
deposits is a representative interest rate, since
Bolivia’s financial markets have not been developed
and individuals do not have diversified portfolios.
Choice of time deposit interest rates is supported by
Melvin ( 1988), in his study on the dollarization of
Latin America.
Data were obtained from a Dossier of the
Unit of Economic Policies Analysis (UDAPE),
which includes statistical information from the
Instituto National de Estadistica, (National Institute
of Statistics), Banco Central de Bolivia (Federal
Reserve Bank of Bolivia), Tesoro General de la
Nation (National Treasury of Bolivia), and
Ministerio de Planificacion (Ministry of Planning).
Monthly data was obtained for money demand,
interest rates, wage rates and exchange rates.
Monthly income and expected inflation data had to
be proxied. For income, we used monthly
government expenditures, since the government is a
major employer and therefore an important source
of income. The use of government expenditures to
estimate the demand for money is supported by
Deravi, et al., who used government expenditures to
proxy wealth. For expected inflation, a lagged
price variable was used, where inflation in the
current period is expected to be at least be as high
as in the previous period.
Empirical analysis estimates the demand
for money in two different time periods, the
hyperinflation period, September 1983-August 1985,
and the stabilization period, September 1985-March
1988. Empirical results are used to test whether
Bolivia’s money demand after stabilization differed
from the previous hyperinflation period using the
Chow test (Kmenta, 1986). Furthermore, the
composition of significant parameters is compared
for the two time periods, A log-linear functional
transformation for both periods was used to estimate
equation ( 1) based on the specifications cited in the
above literature review. The transformed model is
as specified below (note subscripts indicating




+ 04 lnPt.l) + p51n(—
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Period 11 (Stabilization)
A4D(_l)
In(~) = lny,, + y, ln(~)
(-1)
(3)
where previous definitions hold and
Y, = parameters for i = O, .... 6
4 = disturbance term
Empirical Results and Discussion
Empirical results for equations (2) and (3)
are shown in table 2. Models were estimated using
ordinary least squares analysis (OLS) on “SAS”
software. The empirical model was tested for
multicollinearity and autocorrelation. Due to the
presence of multicollinearity, the lagged price index
regressor was dropped, but its presence remains,
since it is embedded within the real lagged money
demand regressor. Listed below each parameter
estimate is its corresponding t-value, which appears
in parentheses. Also listed are the adjusted
coefficients of determination (Adj. R*), the F values,
the Durbin’s “h” test statistics (D W,,), and the
maximum variance inflation factors (Max VIF) to
measure multicollinearity (Kmenta, pp. 438, 1986).
Chow Test
One of the objectives of this research is to
determine whether the demand for money changed
during the stabilization period relative to the
hyperinflation period. The Chow test was used to
verify this hypothesis (Kmenta, 1986). Results for
the pooled regression model used in the Chow test
are presented in table 2. The maintained hypothesis
of the Chow test is that parameter estimates for the
hyperinflation period (equation 2) are equal to
parameter estimates for the stabilization period
(equation 3), The alternative hypothesis is that
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H,, : P,, = 1’,),P, = 1’,>P* = Y*? B, = 1’,>
P, = Y,! P5 = 1’,, P, = Y,
H,, : they are dl~ferenl
(SSE,, - SSE, - SSE,)lk
lf’
(SSE, + SSE2)/n + m - 2k
> F~,,+t~_2~ then reject H<,
(4)
where:
~, are the parameter estimates for the first
period, i = 0,...,6
y, are the parameter estimates for the
second period, i = 0,...,6
SSE(U) = the sum of squared error for
pooled data
SSE( I) = the sum of squared error for
period 1
SSE(2) = the sum of squared error for
period 2
n = number of observations for period 1
m = number of observations for period 2
k = number of regressors
The calculated F value from the Chow test (which
equalled 6.3) indicates a statistically significant
difference between equations (2) and (3) at the one
percent level of significance, These results imply a
difference in money demand between the two
periods indicating that Bolivian’s had greater faith
in their domestic currency and that stabilization
policies were successful.
Thus, we conclude that the demand for
money in Bolivia changed after stabilization policies
were implemented, indicating that the new
government’s objectives for economic growth and
controlling hyperinflation were met in the short run.
In Bolivia, the successful stabilization of the
economy has had significant positive implications.
these estimates differ. For example, prior to 1987, real economic growthI90 De la Barra, Marcharr[ and I,sin[ka: Stabilization PolicJe.! and Agricultural impact.s in Developing Countries
Table 2. Empirical ResultsfortheMoneyDemandEquationsin Bolivia











InIR 0.14 -0.08 -0.06
(1.7) (-2.5) (-1.7)












Adj.R’ 71% 93% 71%
F vatue 11.8 78.8 26.7
DW, 0.97 1.0 0,51
MaxVIF 3.2 5.4 2.8
“ Thef-valuesof theparametersaregiveninparenthesesbelowthecoefficients.
was negative. Since then, economic growth has
been positive and stable (figure 2). For agriculture,
new policies have significantly stabilized the
variability of its economic growth, which also has
been positive since 1987 excluding drought-related
declines in 1989 and 1990. In addition, the
agricultural export share relative to total exports
rose from 3.7 percent in 1984 to a peak of 31.2
percent in 1990 as stabilization policies corrected
for overvalued exchange rates (figure 3).
Overall Statistical Sign(j?cance
The overall relationship among variables
for each of the above time periods was significant
as indicated by the respective correlation
coefficients and F tests. The statistical significance
of our empirical results were dramatically improved
over Asilis, where our lowest adjusted R2 was 71
percent, while Asilis reported an R2 of 35 percent.
From the empirical results, the models explained 7 I
percent and 93 percent of the variation in
real money demand for the hyperinflation and
stabilization periods, respectively. The model
explains more variation and has more significant
parameters during the stabilization period compared
to both the hyperinflation period and the pooled
data.
Lagged Money Demand
As expected, the relationship between
money demand and lagged money demand was
positive for both periods, The parameters (PI and
l’1)~ correspond to elasticities, since the Cobb.
Douglas function was used, Thus, the elasticity of
money demand with respect to the lagged money
demand during hyperinflation was higher (0.48) than
that for the stabilization period (0.39); the same
applies for the standard error. These numbers
indicate that during hyperinflation, Bolivians
adjusted their real money holdings much faster.
Uncertainty about the future, as reflected by a
higher standard error during the hyperinflation
period may have contributed to this behavior.J. Agr. and Applied Ecorr., July, 1995
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Interest Rates underdeveloped Bolivian financial markets. Since
there is no stock market in the country, time
A negative interest rate parameter, (~,), deposits and foreign currency holdings are among
was estimated for the stabilization period as the few ways Bolivians can speculate. A smaller
expected (-0.08), but it was positive for the standard error during the stabilization period implies
hyperinflation period, (y2 = O.14). Both elasticities again that the uncertainty faced during the
were nevertheless small. These results reflect the hyperinflation period diminished afier September192 De la Barra, Marchant and lsmlka. S!ab/1/za//an Po[ic/es and Agr/cu/{ural impacts in Developing Countries
1985. A stable and growing economy attracts
foreign investment. Foreign investment leads to the
development of technology and infrastructure, which
in turn leads to an increase in productivity and
efficiency for the overall economy, including
agriculture.
Income
Government expenditures was used as a
proxy for national income, since the government is
a major employer and therefore an important source
of income. Nevertheless, the relationship between
the demand for money and government expenditures
was found to be direct, as expected, The elasticities
of money demand with respect to government
expenditures (~~ = O.I 1 and yq = O.19), were
significant but rather low.
Wages
Parameters for real wages in both periods,
~5 = 0.07 and y, = 0.4, were positive. Money
demand was more responsive to wages after
stabilization, as expected. During hyperinflation, a
rise in wages lead to a less than proportional
increase in the demand for local currency, since
wages could be saved in alternative assets. The
standard error for wages in the hypcrinflation period
is proportionally greater than the standard cm-or for
the stabilization period, reflecting more uncertainty
in the former period. Since the agricultural sector
employs a significant portion of LDC workers,
growth in agriculture leads to an increase in
employment. In Bolivia, as in many developing
countries, agriculture accounts for over 20 percent
of gross domestic product and employed nearly half
of the work force in 1991 (U.S. Department of
State, 1991).
Exchange Rates
The exchange rate parameters for both
periods, (13J and (yJ, were negative, as expected.
Although both parameters were small (O.I and
0.08), the exchange rate was highly significant
during hyperinflation but not significant during
stabilization. Exchange rates were more relevant in
determining money demand during hyperinflation
discquilibria than during the stabilization period.
During hypcrinflation, Bolivians did not want to
hold their domestic currency for long periods of
time. As such, an excess demand for goods and
foreign currency developed. Government policy
introduced exchange control, consequently, a non-
official parallel market for foreign currency
developed, particularly for the U.S. dollar. During
1984-1985, the U.S. dollar replaced the domestic
currency in many of its functions, including as a
means for payment. The gap between the official
and non-official exchange rates increased rapidly,
while the value of the Bolivian currency dccreascd.
Summary and Conclusions
This research estimated money demand
functions for two different time periods, the
hyperinflation period and the stabilization period.
Empirical results for each time period were
compared to determine ( 1) whether Bolivia’s
demand for money differed during the two time
periods, (2) whether the composition of significant
variables influencing money demand changed, and
(3) the implications of stabilization policies on
agriculture. The Chow test indicated a definite
structural change between the two periods.
Furthermore, the composition of significant
parameters changed. During hyperinflation, lagged
money demand, exchange rates and government
expenditures were statistically significant. After
stabilization, significant parameters included the
above parameters, as well as real wages.
Elasticities with respect to lagged money demand,
interest rates and exchange rates were higher during
the hyperinflation period, indicating that the real
demand for money was more responsive to changes
in these parameters. Uncertainty during
hyperinflation was reflected by larger standard
errors for lagged money demand, interest rates and
wage rates. In general, this model provides more
predictive power during the stabilization period.
For agriculture, we have seen that ( I)
agriculture is a significant portion of the economy
in many developing countries and employs a
significant portion of the workforce; (2) LDCS have
historically taxed their agricultural sector both
directly and indirectly--with indirect taxation often
exceeding direct taxation; (3) WCII meaning
macroeconomic policies instituted by LDCS have
suppressed agricultural exports through over valued
exchange rates; and (4) stabilization policies that
removed economic distortions and regulations in
Boliwa have increased the demand for domesticJ. Agr and Applied Econ , July, 1995 193
currency and resulted in economic growth for the where agricultural exports are no longer penalized
overall economy as well as the agricultural sector, with over valued exchange rates.
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Endnotes
1. [n developing countries, the high taxation of agriculture stems from both direct and indirect price
intervention and is associated with lower growth rates for the economy as a whole, as well as the
agricultural sector (Valdes, 1993; and the World Bank series entitled The Political Economy of Agricultural
Pricing Policy). The World Bank assessed the effects of both direct and indirect intervention on agricultural
prices over 25 years (1960-84) in 18 developing countries throughout the world, for 26 different
commodities. Key findings over all regions (Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Mediterranean) included
(1) developing countries have historically taxed their agricultural sector explicitly as well as implicitly and
subsidized competing agricultural imports; (2) the rate of indirect taxation due to industrial protection policy
and overvalued exchange rates was large in all regions (usually exceeding 20 percent). Also, indirect
taxation was greater than direct taxation on agriculture; and (3) total taxation exceeded 25 percent in all
regions. (World Bank, 199 1). These factors hinder the development of agriculture in LDCS,
2, Our study contributes to the literature by consolidating significant explanatory variables from related
hyperinflation research (Asilis, et al., 1993; Kelfala, 1992; Pastor, 1991; Melvin, 1988); variables which
policymakers may consider in formulating policies, such as income, interest rates, wage rates, exchange
rates, and lagged money demand. In regards to previous research focusing on Bolivia’s hyperinflation,
Asilis, et al. used only two variables to explain the demand for money in Bolivia--lagged inflation and the
variance of inflation. Godoy and De Franco analyzed the impact of high inflation on Bolivia’s agriculture
with ambiguous results. Their methodology differed from Asilis, et al. in that Godoy and De Franco used
descriptive statistics instead of econometric analysis to analyze results, and their time frame may have been
too short for results to be realized in the agricultural sector, as later shown in figure 3.
3. Inflation may escalate despite government controlled prices because of transactions occurring in a
parallel market using other currencies or barter. The government may frequently be forced to revise
controlled prices upwards in order to incorporate inflation,
4, Several monetary aggregates are used to measure liquidity preference. Ml includes currency outside
banks plus demand deposits. Mz includes Ml plus less liquid assets such as time deposits. Generally, when
focusing on the money demand function, Ml or M2 are used. Authors who rely on the transaction money
fimction approach use Ml because they define money solely as a medium of exchange (Argandoiia, 1985).
However, under existing financial innovations, the use of A4zhas become more common (Bagliano and
Favero, 1992; Caramezza, et al. 1990; Arize 1987). In developing economies, such as Bolivia, Ml is the
more likely candidate due to underdeveloped financiaI institutions,196 De la Barra, Marchanl and l.slntka: S[abtlization Poljcles and Agricultural Impacts in Developing Countries
5. According to many theoretical studies, real rather than nominal money balances are important to
consumers because they reflect purchasing power. However, recent articles have focused on nominal
balances, yielding significant results (Gupta and Moazzami, 1990; and Serletis, 1987). The use of nominal
balances to estimate money demand is relevant for stable economies. For economies with chronic inflation
or hyperinflation, the real balance approach is more appropriate since it takes into account the purchasing
power of the domestic currency, The cash balance approach of the quantity theory of money supports this
method (Gupta and Moazzami, 1988; and Arize, 1987).